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I. Introduction 
China’s relationship with the United Nations (“U.N.”) can be 
best described as one of growing tension and constant 
apprehension.1  This tension stems from China’s divergent attitude 
toward human rights, which stands in stark contrast to the United 
 
† J.D. Candidate 2021, University of North Carolina School of Law. Symposium Editor, 
North Carolina Journal of International Law 
 1 See Sonya Sceats & Shaun Breslin, China and the International Human Rights 
System, CHATHAM HOUSE 1 (Oct. 2012), https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/ 
public/Research/International%20Law/r1012_sceatsbreslin.pdf [https://perma.cc/8Y5Y-
LRP8] (“[T]here is still intense speculation and some concern, within Western states and 
elsewhere, about the extent to which China is bringing this economic power to bear in 
other areas of the international system and about its plans in this regard.”). 
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Nations’ dedication to international human rights.2  While many of 
the United Nations’ more prominent member states maintain a 
strong commitment to international human rights, China views 
human rights as a subsidiary foreign policy issue.3  From China’s 
perspective, state sovereignty takes precedence over international 
human rights.4  Consequently, the Chinese government maintains a 
defensive position in the face of human rights criticism and often 
speaks out against any interference with its internal affairs.5  China 
is especially hostile to criticism coming from other states in the U.N. 
General Assembly.6  According to a 2017 Human Rights Watch 
report: 
China has worked consistently and often aggressively to silence 
criticism of its human rights record before U.N. bodies and has 
taken actions aimed at weakening some of the central mechanisms 
available in those institutions to advance rights.7 
To that end, China has used different U.N. political bodies, like 
the Human Rights Council, to pursue its state-sovereignty agenda.8  
This trend has become more pronounced in recent years,9  indicating 
that China’s assertiveness within the Human Rights Council may be 
linked to its growing political clout.  As China continues to solidify 
its position as a global powerhouse, it threatens to substantially 
 
 2 See id. at 4 (“China has no objection to the United Nations expressing concern in 
a proper way over consistent and large-scale human rights violations in a given country, 
but it opposes the interference in other countries’ internal affairs under the pretext of 
defending human rights.”) (citation omitted). 
 3 Id. at 1–2. 
 4 Abbas Faiz, China Is Building a Global Coalition of Human Rights Violators to 




 5 Sceats & Breslin, supra note 1, at 1. 
 6 Id. at 37. 
 7 HUM. RTS. WATCH, THE COSTS OF INTERNATIONAL ADVOCACY: CHINA’S 
INTERFERENCE IN UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS MECHANISMS 1 (2017), 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/chinaun0917_web.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9YHL-WVB7]. 
 8 See id. at 9 (“Within the Human Rights Council, China often advances its positions 
as part of a group of countries that refer to themselves as the Like-Minded Group. . . .”). 
 9 See Sceats & Breslin, supra note 1, at 2 (“In the past year [China] has also emerged 
as a leader of a grouping within the Human Rights Council seeking to reassert the power 
of the state in the face of the popular uprisings that have swept many Arab countries and 
the new threats to social control posed by the internet age.”). 
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weaken the international human rights system.10 
China’s recent treatment of the Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang 
Provence epitomizes the tension between the United Nations’ global 
mission to protect human rights and China’s focus on state 
sovereignty.11  The Chinese government obstinately resists U.N. 
efforts to hold it accountable for human rights violations in Xinjiang 
and uses state sovereignty as an excuse to justify non-compliance 
with U.N. investigation requests.12  By rebuffing international 
criticism of its human rights violations in Xinjiang and refusing to 
cooperate with the United Nations, China further weakens the 
international human rights system by exploiting limitations inherent 
in the system.13  However, the United Nations is not left without 
recourse; at its disposal are several enforcement mechanisms that it 
can use to strengthen its position as an effective intergovernmental 
entity and to compel greater compliance from China. 
One of the more powerful enforcement mechanisms in the 
United Nations’ repertoire is its ability to monitor and report on 
individual states’ compliance through treaty bodies.14  Treaty bodies 
are monitoring entities composed of independent experts tasked 
with conducting unbiased periodic reviews of state efforts to 
comply with particular treaties. In contrast to U.N. political bodies, 
which are composed of representatives acting on behalf of a 
particular state's interests, treaty body experts are unbeholden to any 
state or its political agenda. The nonpartisan nature of treaty bodies 
 
 10 See HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 7, at 1 (“Because of China’s growing 
international influence, the stakes of such interventions go beyond how China’s own 
human rights record is addressed at the U.N. and pose a longer-term challenge to the 
integrity of the system as a whole.”). 
 11 See Faiz, supra note 4 (“China’s approach has been to engage with the U.N.’s 
human rights bodies to impose its own narrative, which misinterprets sovereignty as being 
distinct and above human rights . . . In doing so, it ignores repeated emphasis in 
international human rights law that human rights depend on one another. The exercise of 
one right, such as the right to sovereignty, cannot allow the violation of another, such as 
the right not to be tortured.”). 
 12 Id. 
 13 See generally HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 7 (describing various actions China 
has taken to weaken the U.N. system). 
 14 See ANN KENT, CHINA, THE UNITED NATIONS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE LIMITS OF 
COMPLIANCE 9–10 (1999) (“The strength of the U.N. human rights regime lies chiefly in 
its monitoring powers, with its strongest ‘enforcement’ power being a critical public 
resolution or reports. Exposure is the main instrument at the United Nations’ disposal for 
the protection of human rights.”). 
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means that these bodies cannot be influenced by a state's economic 
and military leverage in the same way that U.N. political bodies, 
like the Human Rights Council and the General Assembly, have 
been. This gives treaty bodies an impartiality that is, by design, 
impossible to attain in U.N. political arenas. What is more, “the 
monitoring processes of the treaty bodies are the principal means 
through which states are held accountable at the international level 
for compliance with their international human rights treaty 
obligations.”15  It therefore follows that the United Nations could 
increase state accountability by bolstering the role of its treaty 
bodies.  Since treaty bodies take a non-adversarial approach to 
monitoring state compliance16 and are unencumbered by political 
pacts, they could potentially prove more effective in handling 
resistance from powerhouse nations than U.N. political bodies do.  
In light of China’s manipulation of U.N. political mechanisms, the 
Uighur crisis in Xinjiang may be better addressed through this non-
partisan approach. 
It is imperative that the United Nations intervene in the Chinese 
Uighur crisis, not only because it is of the most egregious human 
rights violations of the past decade,17 but also because it underscores 
a larger problem with the U.N. system: namely, the United Nations’ 
struggle to enforce human rights laws, particularly when dealing 
with powerful nations such as China.  One of the most ubiquitous 
critiques of international law is that it is unenforceable and 
therefore, pointless.18  This is particularly troubling in the present 
 
 15 Sceats & Breslin, supra note 1, at 36. Each treaty has a group of independent 
experts that assess compliance with the treaty. This group makes up what is referred to as 
a treaty body. See Monitoring the Core International Human Rights Treaties, U.N. HUM. 
RTS. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/ 
WhatTBDo.aspx [https://perma.cc/Z2UY-MF2Z] (last visited Feb. 19, 2021). 
 16 KENT, supra note 14, at 14. 
 17 See US Bars China Officials over Uighur Crackdown in Xinjiang, AL JAZEERA 
(Oct. 9, 2019), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/10/bars-china-officials-xinjiang-
crackdown-191009025000362.html [https://perma.cc/YBV8-L2GT] [hereinafter US Bars 
China Officials] (“Pompeo has previously called China’s treatment of Uighurs one of the 
‘worst stains on the world’ and likened the camps to actions by Nazi Germany.”). 
 18 See Frederic L. Kirgis, Enforcing International Law, AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L. 
INSIGHTS (Jan. 22, 1996), https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/1/issue/1/enforcing-
international-law [https://perma.cc/X2EV-QSDC] (“Nearly always, the first question 
asked about international law is, how can it be law if it cannot be enforced? To experienced 
international lawyers, it is an old and rather tiresome question, not only because it is asked 
so often, but also because of the crucial assumption it contains. The assumption, of course, 
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context “[b]ecause of China’s growing international influence, the 
stakes of such interventions go beyond how China’s own human 
rights record is addressed at the United Nations and pose a longer-
term challenge to the integrity of the system as a whole.”19  The 
existing literature is as saturated with warnings about China’s 
adverse influence on the United Nations as it is with criticisms of 
the United Nations itself.20  However, while it appears that scholars 
have reflected on both the Chinese Uighur crisis and the United 
Nations’ enforcement issue (often independently of each other), 
none have suggested a solution that could resolve both problems. 
Using the Chinese Uighur crisis as a case study, this paper 
examines the existing human rights machinery and recommends a 
solution that may prove effective beyond the problem at hand.  More 
specifically, it analyzes the potential efficacy of a shift in focus from 
the political enforcement mechanisms frequently employed in the 
U.N. human rights context to the non-political methods used by 
treaty bodies.  Non-political enforcement mechanisms are an 
undervalued strength of the U.N. enforcement scheme, one which 
may confer strategic advantages.  This paper ultimately argues that 
U.N. treaty bodies may be better poised to manage resistance from 
China because of their independent and objective nature.  
Part II of this paper presents a detailed account of the Uighur 
crisis in Xinjiang, China’s violations of human rights laws, and the 
current international response.  Part III discusses why China 
presents a special case that necessitates a shift from political 
enforcement mechanisms to non-political methods and why, in this 
case, it may be more effective to support U.N. treaty bodies rather 
than continuing to rely on U.N. political bodies.  It further addresses 
how the role of treaty bodies can be strengthened within the U.N. 
system and possible counter-arguments to this proposed solution. 
 
is that international law cannot be enforced.”). 
 19 HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 7, at 1. 
 20 See Faiz, supra note 4 (warning that China’s mobilization of like-minded 
governments is a dangerous development for the international human rights system); see 
also Kirgis, supra note 18 (explaining there is a general assumption that international law 
cannot be enforced). See generally HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 7 (arguing China has 
deliberately weakened the U.N. system). 
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II. Uighur Case Study 
A. The Current Situation in Xinjiang 
Under the guise of counter-terrorism, the Chinese government 
has arbitrarily detained upwards of two million Muslims in China’s 
Xinjiang province since April 2017.21  The majority of detainees 
belong to the Uighur ethnic group, a Turkish-speaking community 
largely located in Xinjiang22 that makes up less than one percent of 
China’s total population.23  The Chinese government uses the terms 
“reeducation camps” and “vocational training centers” to refer to 
the interment-style camps used to detain Uighur Muslims en 
masse.24  Officials claim that the camps exist to prevent the spread 
of terrorism and to help Uighur Muslims assimilate to Chinese 
culture.25  However, a closer look into the severe methods employed 
at these camps reveals an ethnic cleansing campaign that can only 
be likened to the Holocaust.26 
Though the Chinese government has consistently maintained a 
 
 21 See Lindsay Maizland, China’s Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang, COUNS. ON 
FOREIGN REL., https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-repression-uighurs-xinjiang 
[https://perma.cc/ZW5C-XVGK] (last updated June 30, 2020). 
 22 Other detained Muslim ethnic groups include Kazakhs and Uzbeks. Id. 
 23 Nick Schifrin & Dan Sagalyn, China Calls It Re-education, but Uighur Muslims 
Say It’s ‘Unbearable Brutality’, PBS NEWS HOUR (Oct. 4, 2019), 
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/china-calls-it-re-education-but-uyghur-muslims-
say-its-unbearable-brutality [https://perma.cc/9KUB-9PVN]. 
 24 Maizland, supra note 21; see Omer Kanat, Outrage over China’s Uyghur Crisis Is 
Not a Western Conspiracy, GLOBE POST (Aug. 22, 2019), https://theglobepost.com/ 
2019/08/22/outrage-uyghur-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/VJZ9-BQFQ] (“[T]wo million 
subjected to ‘“re-education camps” for political and cultural indoctrination.’ . . . This was 
the first time that the mass-internment camps had been raised anywhere in a U.N. forum.”). 
 25 Maizland, supra note 21 (“Chinese officials maintain that the camps have two 
purposes: to teach Mandarin, Chinese laws, and vocational skills, and to prevent citizens 
from becoming influenced by extremist ideas, to ‘nip terrorist activities in the bud,’ 
according to a government report.”). 
 26 See Telephone Interview by Scott Simon with Adrian Zenz, Senior Fellow in 
China Studies, Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation (July 4, 2020), transcript 
available at https://www.npr.org/2020/07/04/887239225/china-suppression-of-uighur-
minorities-meets-u-n-definition-of-genocide-report-s [https://perma.cc/E2L8-BSR6] (“A 
new report in Foreign Policy says that China’s suppression of Uighurs, Kazakhs and other 
chiefly Muslim ethnic minorities in northwest China now meets the United Nations 
definition of genocide, mass sterilization, forced abortions and mandatory birth control 
part of a campaign that has swept up more than 1.5 million people and what researcher 
Adrian Zenz calls probably the largest incarceration of an ethnoreligious minority since 
the Holocaust.”). 
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narrative that only mild interventions are used at the camps to 
combat “Islamic extremism,” leaked internal government 
documents indicate otherwise.27  According to the New York Times, 
“[e]ven as the government presented its efforts in Xinjiang to the 
public as benevolent and unexceptional, it discussed and organized 
a ruthless and extraordinary campaign in these internal 
communications.”28  Indeed, the Chinese government has engaged 
in a targeted campaign to crack down on anti-government and anti-
Chinese sentiments among the Uighur population in Xinjiang.29 
Tensions between Uighurs and the Chinese government can be 
traced back to 2009, when a Uighur-led political demonstration in 
Xinjiang’s capital turned into a riot that resulted in significant 
casualties.30  What started as a demonstration protesting “state-
incentivized Han Chinese migration in the region and widespread 
economic and cultural discrimination”31 against Uighur Muslims in 
Xinjiang became the catalyst for what is now one of the most 
egregious discriminatory campaigns by a government entity against 
an ethnoreligious minority since the Holocaust.32 
In the decade since the 2009 riot, the Chinese government has 
come to associate any expression of Islam in the Xinjiang region 
with Islamic extremism and political separatism—33 two ideologies 
that the government fears could pose a significant threaten to the 
Chinese Communist Party’s image of strength, control, and 
 
 27 See Austin Ramzy & Chris Buckley, ‘Absolutely No Mercy’: Leaked Files Expose 
How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-
documents.html [https://perma.cc/LH9X-QWW9] (providing, among other things, “a rare, 
unfiltered look at the origins of the crackdown and the beliefs of the man who set it in 
motion” in a series of secret speeches). 
 28 Id. 
 29 See id. (“Beijing has sought for decades to suppress Uighur resistance to Chinese 
rule in Xinjiang. The current crackdown began after a surge of antigovernment and anti-
Chinese violence . . .  Since 2017, the authorities in Xinjiang have detained many hundreds 
of thousands of Uighurs, Kazakhs and other Muslims in internment camps.  Inmates 
undergo months or years of indoctrination and interrogation aimed at transforming them 
into secular and loyal supporters of the party.”). 
 30 Maizland, supra note 21. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Telephone Interview by Scott Simon with Adrian Zenz, supra note 26. 
 33 See Maizland, supra note 21 (“Chinese officials are concerned that Uighurs hold 
extremist and separatist ideas, and they view the camps as a way of eliminating threats to 
China’s territorial integrity, government, and population.”). 
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domestic stability.34  The government’s fears are so pronounced that 
one simply has to practice Islam to be perceived as a threat of 
national importance requiring the most drastic government 
“interventions.”35  The current landscape is such that, 
Most people in the camps have never been charged with crimes 
and have no legal avenues to challenge their detentions.  The 
detainees seem to have been targeted for a variety of reasons, 
according to media reports, including traveling to or contacting 
people from any of the twenty-six countries China considers 
sensitive, such as Turkey and Afghanistan; attending services at 
mosques; having more than three children; and sending texts 
containing Quranic verses.36 
Officials have also criminalized acts of worship, such as 
abstaining from alcohol and fasting during Ramadan, banned 
certain Muslim baby names, and demolished mosques.37  The 
government has even gone as far as enlisting Chinese Communist 
Party members to live with Uighur families inside their homes to 
report on extremist behavior.38  What falls within the ambit of 
“extremist behavior” is entirely up to the Chinese government and 
can include basic acts of worship like fasting or wearing a veil in 
public.39 
For the majority of detainees imprisoned in the camps, the only 
crime committed was being born into the wrong household—one 
where Islam is practiced instead of any of the other religions that 
the Chinese government finds to be more palatable—and the 
punishment for such a crime is exacting.40  Uighur Muslims who 
 
 34 See Ramzy & Buckley, supra note 27 (“Mr. Xi warned that the violence was 
spilling from Xinjiang into other parts of China and could taint the party’s image of 
strength. Unless the threat was extinguished, Mr. Xi told the leadership conference, ‘social 
stability will suffer shocks, the general unity of people of every ethnicity will be damaged, 
and the broad outlook for reform, development and stability will be affected.’”). 
 35 See Maizland, supra note 21 (“In March 2017, Xinjiang’s government passed an 
anti-extremism law that prohibited people from growing long beards and wearing veils in 
public. It also officially recognized the use of training centers to eliminate extremism . . . 
Often, their only crime is being Muslim, human rights groups say, adding that many 
Uighurs have been labeled as extremists simply for practicing their religion.”). 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 See id. (“In the eyes of Beijing, all Uighurs could potentially be terrorists or 
terrorist sympathizers . . . Following the 9/11 attacks, the Chinese government started 
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fled the camps reported that detainees were subjected to extremely 
harsh and inhumane conditions including: twenty-four-hour 
surveillance; torture; sleep deprivation; involuntary abortions and 
sexual abuse of women; forced labor; renunciation of Islam, Uighur 
culture, and language; separation of children from their parents, 
leaving children in the care of state-run orphanages;41 organ 
harvesting;42 and mass sterilization of women without their 
consent.43 
For the eleven million non-detained Uighur Muslims living in 
Xinjiang outside of the camps, the circumstances are not much 
better.44  The Chinese government has transformed the entire 
Xinjiang province into a surveillance state,45 using facial 
recognition technology and overhead drones to heavily monitor 
resident Uighur Muslims.46  In some Xinjiang cities, the government 
has installed QR codes outside Uighur residents’ homes to facilitate 
easier access to individuals’ personal information.47  At the ground 
level, local police subject residents to intrusive acts including, but 
not limited to, regular scanning of identification cards, cell phone 
searches, forced fingerprinting, DNA and blood sample collections, 
photographs and voice sample collections, and frequent check-point 
inspections.48 
The Chinese government also requires that Uighur Muslims 
provide biometric data in a program advertised as “Physicals for 
 
justifying its actions toward Uighurs as part of the Global War on Terrorism. It said it 
would combat what it calls “the three evils”—separatism, religious extremism, and 
international terrorism—at all costs.”). 
 41 Maizland, supra note 21. 
 42 Will Martin, China Is Harvesting Thousands of Human Organs from Its Uighur 
Muslim Minority, UN Human-Rights Body Hears, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 25, 2019), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/china-harvesting-organs-of-uighur-muslims-china-
tribunal-tells-un-2019-9 [https://perma.cc/X3EM-RZLC]. 
 43 Telephone Interview by Scott Simon with Adrian Zenz, supra note 26. 
 44 See Maizland, supra note 21 (“Even before the camps became a major part of the 
Chinese government’s anti-extremism campaign, the government was accused of cracking 
down on religious freedom and basic human rights in Xinjiang.”). 
 45 Id. 
 46 Sigal Samuel, China Claims It’s Released Most Muslims from Internment Camps. 
That’s Doubtful., VOX (July 30, 2019), https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2019/7/30/ 
20747028/china-uighur-muslims-internment-camps-forced-labor [https://perma.cc/8P5L-
5URC]. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
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All.”49  The information gathered is then entered into a robust 
database called the Integrated Joint Operations Platform that uses 
artificial intelligence to produce lists of “suspicious people.”  These 
lists then serve as the basis for further subjugation of Muslim 
residents.50  In fact, “[c]lassified Chinese government documents 
released by the International Consortium of Investigative 
Journalists (ICIJ) in November 2019 revealed that more than fifteen 
thousand Xinjiang residents were placed in detention centers during 
a seven-day period in June 2017 after being flagged by the 
algorithm.”51 
Despite the existence of incriminating evidence detailing 
China’s appalling actions in Xinjiang, the Chinese government has 
repeatedly tried to control the narrative by shrouding the entire 
ordeal in secrecy.52  This, in turn, underscores China’s larger aim of 
maintaining a positive public image while continuing to engage in 
crimes against humanity.53  Leaked government documents also 
reveal the Chinese government’s fear that general public perception 
may shift in favor of Uighur liberation.  If, for example, Uighur 
students returning home from college find their family members 
detained, they might use social media platforms to create a narrative 
that would be “widespread and difficult to eradicate.”54  The 
Chinese government’s preoccupation with public opinion may be 
indicative of a deeper insecurity that mounting domestic pressure 
might force the government’s hand into ending their genocidal 
crusade against Uighur Muslims.  Given the right circumstances, 
China’s insecurity could be taken advantage of to “name and 
shame” it into human rights compliance. 
 
 49 Maizland, supra note 21. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 See Ramzy & Buckley, supra note 27 (“Of the 24 documents, the directive on how 
to handle minority students returning home to Xinjiang in the summer of 2017 offers the 
most detailed discussion of the indoctrination camps—and the clearest illustration of the 
regimented way the party told the public one story while mobilizing around a much harsher 
narrative internally.”). 
 53 See id. (“Beijing has sought for decades to suppress Uighur resistance to Chinese 
rule in Xinjiang.”); see also HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 7, at 43 (“China regards it as 
important to look good.”). 
 54 Ramzy & Buckley, supra note 27 (“‘Returning students from other parts of China 
have widespread social ties across the entire country,’ the directive noted.  ‘The moment 
they issue incorrect opinions on WeChat, Weibo and other social media platforms, the 
impact is widespread and difficult to eradicate.’”). 
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B. The Human Rights Violations in Xinjiang 
According to a Foreign Policy report released in the summer of 
2020, “China’s suppression of Uighurs, Kazakhs and other chiefly 
Muslim ethnic minorities in northwest China now meets the U.N. 
definition of genocide.”55  For the first time, there is evidence that 
the Chinese government has engaged in actions that directly violate 
one of the five criteria set forth by the United Nations Convention 
for the Punishment and Prevention of the Crime of Genocide from 
1948, namely, the suppression of birth.56  Actions by the Chinese 
government also likely amount to human rights violations, 
including:57 discriminating against Uighur Muslims; restraining 
their basic freedoms of assembly and religion; disallowing them to 
express their language or culture; depriving them of liberty without 
due process; forcing them to perform manual labor; constraining 
their freedom of movement; and inflicting serious bodily harm.  
These rights are also enshrined in five U.N. treaties that China has 
signed and ratified, including:58 the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination;59 the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women;60 the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment;61 the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;62 and the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child.63  By violating human rights 
 
 55 Telephone Interview by Scott Simon with Adrian Zenz, supra note 26. 
 56 Id. 
 57 See generally UN Treaty Bodies and China, HUM. RTS. IN CHINA (2013), 
https://www.hrichina.org/en/un-treaty-bodies-and-china [https://perma.cc/N9B3-7277] 
(describing the rights protected by each treaty that China has signed and ratified). 
 58 See id. (listing and describing the six U.N. human rights treaties that China is party 
to). 
 59 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, opened for signature Dec. 21, 1965, T.I.A.S. 94-1120, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 
(entered into force Jan. 4, 1969). 
 60 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 
opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981). 
 61 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force 
June 26, 1987). 
 62 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for 
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976). 
 63 Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990). 
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expressly protected in the U.N. treaties it has signed and ratified,64 
China continues to demonstrate a blatant disregard for the concept 
of human rights. 
China is also signatory to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), though it has not yet ratified the 
treaty.65  This, in effect, means that China has not yet enacted 
domestic laws implementing the treaty and is therefore not legally 
bound by its specific provisions. Regardless of this fact, however, 
China’s position as a signatory obligates it to act in good faith and 
to avoid circumventing the directives of the ICCPR.66  The ICCPR 
aims to preserve human dignity by protecting civil and political 
rights, as well as economic, social, and cultural rights.67  It explicitly 
mandates that ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities “not be 
denied the right, in community with the other members of their 
group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own 
religion, or to use their own language.”68  Not only do China’s 
actions in Xinjiang run contrary to the purpose of the ICCPR, but 
they violate almost all of the rights protected by the treaty.69 
C. The International Response to China’s Actions 
The initial global response to reports of human rights abuses in 
Xinjiang was one of condemnation and intense criticism.70  Among 
other reactions, 
The U.N. human rights chief and other U.N. officials have 
 
 64 See generally UN Treaty Bodies and China, supra note 57 (listing and describing 
the six U.N. human rights treaties that China is party to). 
 65 Id.; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 27, opened for 
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976). 
 66 See generally UN Treaty Bodies and China, supra note 57. 
 67 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976). 
 68 Id.; John H. Knox, Climate Change and Human Rights Law, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 
163, 185 (2009). 
 69 See generally International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 127 Dec. 
16, 1966, S. EXEC. DOC. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171; Knox, supra note 68, at 185. 
 70 Maizland, supra note 21; see also Elizabeth Paton & Austin Ramzy, Coalition 
Brings Pressure to End Forced Uighur Labor, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2020/07/23/fashion/uighur-forced-labor-cotton-fashion.html [https://perma.cc/B9TV-
6TYM] (last updated Aug. 10, 2020) (“[M]ore than 190 organizations spanning 36 
countries issued a call to action, seeking formal commitments from clothing brands to cut 
all ties with suppliers implicated in Uighur forced labor and to end all sourcing from the 
Xinjiang region of China in the next twelve months.”). 
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demanded access to the camps.  The European Union has called 
on China to respect religious freedom and change its policies in 
Xinjiang.  And human rights organizations have urged China to 
immediately shut down the camps and answer questions about 
disappeared Uighurs.71 
A group of twenty-two U.N. Human Rights Council member 
nations signed a letter in July 2019 reprimanding China for its 
treatment of Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang.72  Within days, however, 
the global response shifted in a different direction.73  China quickly 
amassed a “global coalition of human rights violators to defend its 
record in Xinjiang.”74  This coalition of thirty-seven nations signed 
a different letter endorsing China’s actions in Xinjiang.75  Among 
those supporting China were nations with similar repressive 
regimes, including the Muslim-majority nations of Saudi Arabia 
and Pakistan.76  With the exception of Turkey—whose Foreign 
Minister spoke out against the Chinese government’s oppression of 
Uighur Muslims—other Muslim nations have been notably silent, 
preferring instead to maintain a strong strategic and economic 
relationship with China.77 
The support of these thirty-seven nations, coupled with China’s 
vast economic power, has allowed China to continue its operations 
in Xinjiang unhindered.78  Despite widespread recognition that 
China’s actions in Xinjiang violate numerous human rights laws, 
the U.N. Human Rights Council is powerless to enforce 
international human rights laws.79  The Human Rights Council’s 
system is political in nature and requires member states’ 
 
 71 Maizland, supra note 21. 
 72 Faiz, supra note 4. 
 73 See id. (“A few days later, a second letter emerged.”). 
 74 Kanat, supra note 24. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Maizland, supra note 21. 
 78 See Faiz, supra note 4 (“China’s economic might and worldwide influence enable 
it to deflect international criticism of its poor human rights record. With a growing army 
of like-minded governments behind it, international human rights safeguards have never 
been so dangerously exposed.”). 
 79 See HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 7, at 4 (“Unless the U.N. and concerned 
governments can halt such efforts to manipulate or weaken U.N. human rights 
mechanisms, the U.N.’s ability to help protect rights around the globe is at risk not only in 
Geneva.”). 
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cooperation to implement substantive corrective action or pass 
meaningful mandates.80  China is one of the U.N. Security Council’s 
five permanent members81 and as a permanent member, China 
can—and likely will—veto any measure that the Security Council 
might propose to address the situation in Xinjiang.82  Thus, any 
measures taken by U.N. political bodies, like the Human Rights 
Council or the Security Council, will likely not prove effective in 
holding China accountable83 for what could conceivably become the 
most egregious human rights crisis of our lifetime.84 
Outside of the U.N. apparatus, the United States has taken a 
surprisingly85 firm stance against China’s persecution of Uighur 
Muslims.  In a series of power moves, the United States has 
leveraged its position as China’s strongest economic rival to mount 
increasing pressure on the Chinese government to curtail its 
oppressive regime in Xinjiang.  Not only has the United States 
restricted visas for Chinese officials and blacklisted companies 
directly involved with the Chinese Uighur Crisis,86 it has also passed 
a law that levies heavy sanctions on any individual or company 
whose activities contribute to the human rights violations in 
Xinjiang.87  Given the United States’ position as an international 
 
 80 See generally Faiz, supra note 4 (explaining the efficacy of the United Nations 
and, by extension, human rights laws depend on the cooperation of countries). 
 81 United Nations Security Council Fast Facts, CNN WORLD (Apr. 2, 2019), 
https://www.cnn.com/2013/09/03/world/united-nations-security-council-fast-
facts/index.html [https://perma.cc/CZ37-KWLT] (last updated Apr. 9, 2020). 
 82 See id. (“A ‘NO’ vote from one of the five permanent members kills the resolution.  
There is no such thing as a ‘VETO’ vote in formal U.N. rules, though a ‘NO’ vote from a 
permanent member has the effect of vetoing a resolution.”). 
 83 See Faiz, supra note 4 (“China is recruiting like-minded governments to push its 
line on sovereignty . . . The stronger this menacing form of solidarity grows, the less 
effective human rights safeguards will be in these countries.”). 
 84 See US Bars China Officials, supra note 17 (“Pompeo has previously called 
China’s treatment of Uighurs one of the “worst stains on the world” and likened the camps 
to actions by Nazi Germany.”). 
85 In light of allegations by President Trump’s former National Security Advisor 
that the President initially supported China’s crackdown on Uighur Muslims, the United 
States’ staunch stance against Uighur subjugation is a rather surprising development. For 
more information, see Steven Lee Myers, China Lashes Out at U.S.’s Action Against 
Mass Incarcerations, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/18/world/asia/china-trump-pompeo-xinjiang-uighurs-
bolton.html [https://perma.cc/QR5J-UL5N]. 
 86 See id. 
 87 Maizland, supra note 21; see also Ana Swanson, Nike and Coca-Cola Lobby 
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powerhouse and the United Nations’ inherent limitations as an 
intergovernmental organization, the United States’ actions hold 
promise.  However, this type of bilateral state intervention “should 
be seen as only an indirect or, at the very most, a supplementary 
agent of change” because it “lacks international authority and 
legitimation.”88  Additionally, the restrictions implemented by the 
United States are vulnerable to verbal counter-attacks from China 
that they are unauthorized and illegitimate, as well as potential 
retaliatory legislation aimed at economically crippling the United 
States.89 
III. Bolstering the Role of U.N. Treaty Bodies 
Every major human rights treaty has a corresponding committee 
or treaty body tasked with interpreting the treaty and monitoring 
states’ compliance.90  Treaty bodies are staffed with a team of 
independent experts that assess states’ reports of their respective 
compliance and conduct periodic reviews of each state that has 
ratified the treaty.91  Treaty bodies also oversee country inquiries, 
review individual complaints, and issue “general comments” 
interpreting various treaty provisions.92  The reporting system 
 
Against Xinjiang Forced Labor Bill, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/29/ 
business/economy/nike-coca-cola-xinjiang-forced-labor-bill.html [https://perma.cc/5U8 
Z-DZ8V] (last updated Dec. 15, 2020) (“The bill, which would prohibit broad categories 
of certain goods made by persecuted Muslim minorities in an effort to crack down on 
human rights abuses, has gained bipartisan support, passing the House in September by a 
margin of 406 to 3. Congressional aides say it has the backing to pass the Senate, and could 
be signed into law by either the Trump administration or the incoming Biden 
administration. But the legislation, called the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, has 
become the target of multinational companies including Apple whose supply chains touch 
the far western Xinjiang region, as well as of business groups including the U.S. Chamber 
of Commerce. Lobbyists have fought to water down some of its provisions, arguing that 
while they strongly condemn forced labor and current atrocities in Xinjiang, the act’s 
ambitious requirements could wreak havoc on supply chains that are deeply embedded in 
China.”). 
 88 KENT, supra note 14, at 12. 
 89 See Sceats & Breslin, supra note 1, at 12 (“China’s strongest counter-attacks are, 
however, directed at the United States.”); see also Myers, supra note 85 (detailing China’s 
counterattack following U.S.-imposed sanctions on Chinese officials involved in Uighur 
subjugation). 
 90 See HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 7, at 7. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Monitoring the Core International Human Rights Treaties, supra note 15. 
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serves as the treaty bodies’ primary supervisory mechanism,93 so it 
is critical that treaty bodies produce accurate reports untainted by 
political influences.  Staffing treaty bodies with independent experts 
safeguards the process from governmental interference and political 
pressure. 
For treaty bodies to function as intended, states need to provide 
their consent and continued cooperation, which makes treaty bodies 
non-adversarial by design.94  Treaty bodies predominantly exist to 
help states meet compliance goals, not to criticize poor 
performance.95  This is exemplified in the treaty bodies’ four central 
objectives: 
1. To make states accountable for their human rights to the 
international community; 
2. To encourage them to review measures to bring national law 
and policy in line with the conventions; 
3. To monitor states’ progress made in the de jure and de facto 
implementation of rights; and 
4. To facilitate public scrutiny of government policies and [Non-
Governmental Organization] participation.96 
A. China, a Special Case Necessitating a Shift from the 
Enforcement Mechanisms of U.N. Political Bodies to Non-
Political Methods 
China presents a special case “[b]ecause of its ascribed 
superpower status, its economic and strategic muscle, and 
particularly its position as a Permanent Member of the Security 
Council.”97  The situation is further complicated by China’s 
reticence to accept human rights criticism, its distinctive position 
that state sovereignty precludes U.N. interference with domestic 
affairs, and its willingness to manipulate U.N. political bodies in 
furtherance of its state sovereignty agenda.  Understanding the 
interplay of these complex factors better informs considerations of 
a possible solution to the Chinese Uighur crisis and explains why 
recent U.N. interventions have been unsuccessful.  The solution 
 
 93 KENT, supra note 14, at 14. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. at 15. 
 96 Id. at 14. 
 97 Id. at 2. 
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proposed here is tailored with those facts in mind: namely, that 
China’s unique situation necessitates greater reliance on the United 
Nations’ non-political methods.  Bolstering the role of U.N. treaty 
bodies may prove more effective in garnering China’s compliance 
with human rights laws than current methods of intervention. 
To fully appreciate the potential advantages of the proposed 
treaty body approach, one must first understand why recent political 
efforts to address the Chinese Uighur crisis have failed.  To date, 
the overwhelming international response to China’s internment of 
Uighur Muslims has been one of criticism and admonishment.  
Various nations on the Human Rights Council, as well as U.N. 
officials, have openly and publicly condemned China’s actions.  
The United States has taken things a step further by actively 
imposing restrictions on Chinese companies and government 
officials involved in Uighur subjugation.  The predominant effect of 
these collective efforts is to demand that China stop oppressing 
Uighur Muslims “or else.”  Typically, a strong no-bull approach 
carries weight because it is inherently backed by the political clout 
of the state(s) involved.  The more powerful the state doing the 
condemning, the more likely the accused state will modify its 
behavior to better conform with human rights norms for fear of the 
consequences they may face otherwise.98  Though this approach is 
generally effective with most offender states, it has not been 
particularly fruitful when dealing with China.99  The political and 
adversarial nature of this strategy has thus far led only to China 
responding by flexing its muscles.  This has been true in the past100 
and it still rings true today.  Instead of modifying its treatment of 
Uighur Muslims in response to intense international pressure, China 
has used its own political influence to reshape the discourse.101  For 
 
 98 See HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 7, at 77–79 (discussing how, as one of the 
world’s most powerful nations, China often uses its political power to shape the behavior 
of smaller nations that cannot afford to be foreclosed from conducting trade with China). 
 99 See Sceats & Breslin, supra note 1, at 11–12 (“Although these and other episodes 
of repression have made international headlines, the situation of human rights in China has 
remained firmly off the Council’s agenda. Clearly this reflects the new balance of power 
within the Human Rights Council, but there is also a sense of defeatism among many 
Western diplomats about the utility of using even an unsuccessful China resolution as a 
lever.”). 
 100 See KENT, supra note 14, at 234 (explaining that, in response to intense political 
pressure from the United Nations for the Tiananmen Square killings, China’s reaction was 
total disownment of U.N. authority). 
 101 See Faiz, supra note 4 (describing how China secured the support of thirty-seven 
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this reason and others discussed below, efforts to hold China 
accountable in U.N. political arenas will likely continue to fail and 
should be approached with caution. 
Foremost among these reasons is that China’s immense political 
power and resources make it almost untouchable in U.N. political 
arenas like those of the Human Rights Council and General 
Assembly.  In spite of compelling evidence of grave human rights 
violations, China’s human rights record has garnered relatively little 
attention from the Human Rights Council.102  The Council has 
avoided addressing certain Chinese human rights abuses, even if 
those abuses were the subject of considerable public outcry.103  
Human rights experts at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
also known as the Chatham House, noted that this pattern: 
Reflects the new balance of power within the Human Rights 
Council, but there is also a sense of defeatism among many 
Western diplomats about the utility of using even an unsuccessful 
China resolution as a lever.  One senior European diplomat in 
Geneva said that these days ‘no one would dare’ table a resolution 
on China and another that the Chinese government has ‘managed 
to dissuade states from action—now people don’t even raise it.’104 
As such, China will likely continue to wield its power as a shield 
against political pressure from other members of the U.N. Human 
Rights Council. 
China approaches human rights issues within the General 
Assembly in largely the same way that it does those arising in the 
U.N. Human Rights Council.105  That is, it uses General Assembly 
committees to advance its own human rights agenda in a similar 
fashion.106  One notable difference, however, is how China reacts to 
criticism from the two U.N. political bodies.  Though it can be said 
that China is always sensitive to criticism of its human rights 
activities, it is particularly “sensitive to human rights criticism from 
other states in the General Assembly, which probably reflects that 
body’s higher institutional standing and broader membership 
 
nations with regard to the Uighur crisis). 
 102 Sceats & Breslin, supra note 1, at 11. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. at 12. 
 105 Id. at 37. 
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compared with the Human Rights Council.”107 
In general, efforts to strongarm China through political means 
should proceed with caution because U.N. political entities are 
especially vulnerable to Chinese manipulation.  China’s ultimate 
objective is to eliminate U.N. interference with its domestic human 
rights record.108  It employs several manipulative tactics to achieve 
this goal and engineer desired outcomes within U.N. political 
bodies.  First, China exercises restraint with respect to the matters it 
engages in, while also working tirelessly to undermine U.N. 
accountability mechanisms through underhanded means.109  One of 
the ways through which China accomplishes this task is by signing 
onto positions proposed by countries of the “Like-Minded Group,” 
a self-proclaimed indeterminate group of countries within the 
Human Rights Council that regularly support each other’s political 
aims and have a shared goal of undermining the human rights 
system.110  In this way, China lets other members of the Like-
Minded Group take the assertive leadership position, while it plays 
a passive role,111 which allows it to simultaneously keep a low 
profile and maintain a position of power.112  By strategically 
supporting the positions of numerous countries sharing its views, 
China evades criticism whilst achieving its own objectives.113 
 
 107 Id. at 37. 
 108 Sceats & Breslin, supra note 1, at 55. 
 109 Id. 
 110 See HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 7, at 9 (“Within the Human Rights Council, 
China often advances its positions as part of a group of countries that refer to themselves 
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Council and have worked together to weaken the universality of human rights standards 
and resist the Council’s ability to adopt country-specific approaches.”). 
 111 Id. (“As one diplomat noted, in the Council, Chinese diplomats “don’t take the 
leadership. They have others to play this game. . . .  Other actors are in charge of the dirty 
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 112 See Sceats & Breslin, supra note 1, at 55 (“China is remarkably judicious about 
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holds the upper hand.”). 
 113 See HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 7, at 9. 
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Another way in which China manages to contemporaneously 
keep a low profile and strengthen its power within the United 
Nations is by encouraging the use of bilateral human rights 
dialogues, or private one-on-one negotiations.114  The Chinese 
government rewards countries that agree to resolve human rights 
issues through the use of bilateral dialogues, instead of by engaging 
public human rights mechanisms.115  These dialogues serve as “an 
insurance policy of sorts” against Council resolutions on human 
rights concerns in China.116  Little is known about what goes on 
during these bilateral dialogues, as they are part of the diplomatic 
process and are private by design, but they have been described as 
“notoriously problematic.”117  More specifically, bilateral dialogues 
have been repeatedly criticized by several countries and Non-
Governmental Organizations (“NGOs”) for being inherently non-
transparent and potentially ineffectual, particularly because they 
have consistently failed to produce tangible results with respect to 
China’s human rights abuses—118 which is likely why China prefers 
them to other U.N. interventions. 
Second, China has taken a strategic position as the “champion 
of developing countries” in an effort to expand its support base 
within the United Nations.119  In its role as “champion,” China 
comes to the defense of certain developing countries—typically 
members of the Like-Minded Group—and supports their issues of 
interest.120  It defends even the worst human rights abusers by 
arguing against country-specific actions at the Human Rights 
Council.121  China’s stance against country-specific actions is likely 
 
 114 See Sceats & Breslin, supra note 1, at 30 (“China had assiduously avoided any 
demonstration of leadership within the Council, maintaining a low-profile during 
negotiations and preferring to raise its concerns privately and bilaterally.”). 
 115 HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 7, at 80. 
 116 Sceats & Breslin, supra note 1, at 18. 
 117 Id. at 39. 
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and outside Western governments about whether the dialogues have delivered any tangible 
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 119 HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 7, at 77. 
 120 Id. See also supra note 110 and accompanying text (listing countries China 
supports as part of the Like-Minded Group). 
 121 HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 7, at 82 (“China has long argued against country-
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the result of its own fear of being singled out for human rights 
abuses.  This strategy is also strategically advantageous for China 
because it allows the powerhouse nation to garner the support of 
developing countries and foster an environment of political 
solidarity, all while undermining the Human Rights Council.122  
Moreover, China works in tandem with other countries from the 
Like-Minded Group to forestall the passage of initiatives aimed at 
protecting individual rights, especially those pertaining to political 
and civil rights.123 
Third, China often praises “the human rights records of 
countries that have been supportive of [it].  At the same time, the 
Chinese government, like other major powers at the United Nations, 
seeks to exert economic and political pressure on countries to obtain 
its goals.”124  China has been known to threaten punitive actions, 
such as implementing a diplomatic freeze or blocking a country 
from participating in the Chinese market, to manipulate affairs on 
the Human Rights Council.125  This often leads countries, including 
those from the West, to alter their behavior in ways that better 
conform to China’s wishes.126  In addition to wielding its market and 
political power, China also uses developmental aid to obfuscate 
U.N. resolutions and sway public opinion in its favor.127  It has 
become “a major lender to developing and developed states” 
alike,128 and it does so without any strings attached.129  While 
seemingly altruistic, China’s “no strings attached” approach is 
actually cause for concern.  Many Western countries use aid 
packages to encourage international human rights compliance in 
developing countries.130  Without the economic pressure of aid 
 
specific action at the Human Rights Council, even for the worst abusers of human rights.”). 
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 125 Id. at 79. 
 126 See id. (“China’s threats of punitive action, such as shutting out a country from the 
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 129 See id. 
 130 Id. 
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packages, dictators can thwart demands to improve their human 
rights records.131  China’s no strings attached lending effectually 
reinforces the idea that there is no real downside to crimes against 
humanity, so long as you have the powerhouse nation as an ally.  
Lastly, when faced with criticism, China often attempts to 
change the narrative by attacking other countries’ human rights 
records.132  For instance, after the European Union spoke out about 
China’s mistreatment of Uighur protesters in July of 2009, China 
responded by labeling the protests “violent crimes organized by 
separatists” and redirected attention to the European Union’s own 
discriminatory practices perpetrated in the fight against terrorism.133  
This type of behavior is harmful because “the Human Rights 
Council cannot be an effective inter-governmental body if countries 
respond to a human rights critique by attacking those raising 
concerns for also having human rights problems.”134 
Therefore, attempts to use political power to induce Chinese 
cooperation may actually spur an antithetical result.  China has 
generally maintained a defensive stance within the international 
human rights system.135  Over the last decade, it has not been 
receptive to visits by U.N. human rights personnel like the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, preferring to limit its approval to 
only those visits that would result in positive reviews.136  It has been 
particularly resistant to U.N. political mechanisms,137 most likely 
 
 131 See id. (“For example, a leaked diplomatic cable from the US embassy in Colombo 
in 2007 exposed a concern that Western donors were being displaced by China and other 
developing-world donors offering ‘aid without conditions’: ‘As Sri Lanka taps into new 
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due to its desire to retain political control in the global arena and 
provide social stability domestically.138  Hence, China has 
demonstrated firm hostility to U.N. actions that it perceives as being 
more political in nature.139 
Part of the reason for China’s hostility concerns its own past 
experiences with the United Nations.140  Following China’s 
crackdown on a Democratic Movement in June 1989, in what is 
referred to as the “Tiananmen Square Killings,” U.N. delegates 
applied “rigorous, overt, and sustained multilateral and bilateral 
pressures.”141  China was then intensely monitored by the United 
Nations142 and became the focus of strict sanctions from both 
financial institutions and other nations.143  This resulted in China 
taking a strong stance against U.N. human rights norms, ultimately 
rejecting them entirely.144  It deflected international criticism by 
reasserting its standpoint that state sovereignty precludes U.N. 
interference, arguing that its sovereign acts do not require 
justification.  State sovereignty has always been a staple of China’s 
disposition towards the United Nations.145  However, 
From [the Tiananmen Square incident] onwards it became a 
central plank of [China’s] general agenda within the U.N. to 
promote ultra-statist conceptions of sovereignty and the principle 
of non-interference.  Thus, China rejected outright the legitimacy 
of resolutions on its domestic situation, arguing that they 
‘constituted interference in China’s affairs and an attempt to exert 
pressure on China’ and were ‘incompatible with the purposes and 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations.146 
The Chinese government cites its experience in the aftermath of 
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the Tiananmen Square crackdown as coloring its perception of the 
international human rights system.147  Even now, it continues to 
affect China’s standpoint on U.N. interference in domestic affairs.148  
Therefore, this paper advocates for a divergence from the methods 
historically used to address China’s human rights violations to ones 
not marred by decades of tension and power struggles.  
B. Greater Emphasis on Non-Political Enforcement 
Mechanisms Like Those of U.N. Treaty Bodies 
According to Ann Kent, author of China, The United Nations, 
and Human Rights: The Limits of Compliance, “the strength of the 
U.N. human rights regime lies chiefly in its monitoring powers, with 
its strongest ‘enforcement’ power being a critical public resolution 
or reports.  ‘Exposure’ is the main instrument at the United Nations’ 
disposal for the protection of human rights.”149  In fact, the primary 
tool used to hold states accountable for their compliance with 
international human rights laws is the treaty bodies’ monitoring 
processes.150 
Treaty bodies may be better equipped to handle resistance than 
U.N. political bodies because of their objective nature.  That is to 
say, treaty bodies are isolated from other political processes within 
the United Nations, which enables them to work effectively even in 
the face of intense opposition.  Although treaty bodies require state 
cooperation to carry out certain functions,151  they can still condemn 
a state’s actions irrespective of its acquiescence or position of 
power.152  This allows treaty bodies to be bold in a way that U.N. 
political bodies cannot afford to be when bringing attention to an 
 
 147 See id. (“Today memories of this era in Geneva are still very strong within Chinese 
foreign-policy circles and continue to influence attitudes towards the international human 
rights system.”). 
 148 See id. (explaining how this event relates to China’s current perspective on U.N. 
interference). 
 149 KENT, supra note 14, at 10. 
 150 Sceats & Breslin, supra note 1, at 36. 
 151 See KENT, supra note 14, at 13–14. 
 152 See Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations 
on the Combined Fourteenth to Seventeenth Periodic Reports of China (including Hong 
Kong, China and Macao, China), paras. 40–41, U.N. Doc.CERD/C/CHN/CO/14-17 (Sept. 
19, 2018), https://undocs.org/en/CERD/C/CHN/CO/14-17 [https://perma.cc/TKH9-
8Z7C] (acknowledging China’s denials about mistreatment of Uighur Muslims, but still 
reporting on the matter and recommending that China make certain policy changes). 
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issue.  Due to the nature of U.N. political bodies as inter-
governmental entities dependent on multi-national cooperation, 
these bodies are heavily influenced by political clout.  The ability to 
bring attention to an issue serves a valuable standard-setting 
function, whereby standards are set and countries that do not 
comply are “named and shamed” into changing their behavior.  The 
Chinese government’s avoidance of criticism makes it particularly 
sensitive to naming and shaming tactics.153   
Though naming and shaming has not been a viable strategy for 
addressing China’s human rights abuses in the U.N. political arenas, 
it may be more effective when employed by treaty bodies for the 
following reasons.  It is no secret that China is heavily invested in 
controlling its public image, both globally and domestically.  As 
discussed above, China typically reacts to public admonishment in 
one of the four following ways: (1) deflection (i.e., pointing to the 
accusing nation’s own human rights abuses); (2) manipulation (i.e., 
using its political might to influence the actions and opinions of 
other countries); (3) changing the narrative to paint itself in a 
favorable light (i.e., drumming up support for its actions among the 
Like-Minded nations); or (4) claiming state sovereignty (i.e., 
refusing to justify its actions on the grounds that it does not have to 
answer to anyone).  While China will always be able to claim state 
sovereignty regardless of which entity is criticizing it, three of the 
four tactics are only useful insofar as other nation are involved and 
China is able to wield its political power to influence the outcome.  
This means that the majority of China’s go-to tactics are only useful 
in U.N. political arenas, making them completely ineffectual when 
the source of the criticism is not another nation but is, in fact, a 
treaty body.  Therefore, placing greater reliance on treaty bodies 
may prove fruitful in nudging China towards reforming its actions 
in Xinjiang and increasing its compliance with human rights laws. 
Moreover, China’s past experiences with treaty bodies indicates 
that these bodies may be a better alternative to U.N. political body 
enforcement mechanisms.  China has routinely demonstrated 
hostility to initiatives proposed by U.N. political bodies, but its 
 
 153 See Sceats & Breslin, supra note 1, at 5–6 (“When, in the aftermath of the 
Tiananmen Square killings, it became clear that China might be the subject of formal 
censure by the Sub-Commission, the government’s opposition to ‘naming and shaming’ 
approaches crystallized.”). 
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resistance to treaty body actions has been less pronounced.154  That 
is not to say that U.N. treaty bodies do not experience difficulties 
dealing with China.  To the contrary, China has pushed back against 
U.N. treaty bodies much like it has other U.N. bodies.  However, 
China’s reaction to treaty bodies’ inquiries has varied considerably 
based on how threatening it perceived an issue to be.155  In select 
cases, “China has been described as taking its reviews before the 
committees seriously and engaging earnestly without significant 
problems, while in other cases the Chinese delegation’s actions have 
been described as marred by bullying, harassment, and 
interference.”156  China’s need to minimize criticism and maximize 
positive public opinion appear to be the reasons behind its 
antagonistic behavior.157  China’s preoccupation with public 
opinion means that it is naturally less inclined to cooperate with 
treaty bodies on some sensitive issues for fear of being perceived 
negatively,158 while also feeling the need to improve public 
perception by thoroughly preparing for its reviews and fully 
participating in the monitoring process on less sensitive issues.159  
Notwithstanding this level of resistance, U.N. treaty bodies have 
continued to uphold their “standards and their rigor.”160  Overall, 
although China has had mixed responses to treaty bodies, its 
cooperation in certain situations shows a greater likelihood of 
compliance than has been the case with traditional U.N. political 
mechanisms which have consistently failed. 
 
 154 See id. at 35 (“China’s compliance record with the treaties to which it is party is 
generally satisfactory in procedural terms. It submits its periodic reports, though—as is the 
case for many other states—they are sometimes very late, and fields large, well-prepared 
delegations to participate in examinations.”). 
 155 See HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 7, at 9 (“[China] appears to allow visits 
primarily by independent experts on topics that it sees as nonthreatening.”). 
 156 Id. 
 157 See id. at 43 (“Incidents of harassment or manipulation appear driven by China’s 
desire to deter criticism. As one U.N. expert observed, ‘First and foremost, I think it’s fair 
to say that China regards it as important to look good—to get a good report from a number 
of United Nations committees.’”). 
 158 Sceats & Breslin, supra note 1, at 35. 
 159 HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 7, at 43 (“China is often described as preparing for 
and participating in its reviews in a serious, thorough manner.”). 
 160 KENT, supra note 14, at 250 (“Since 1997, the U.N. Human Rights Commission 
and Sub-Commission have become less effective in dealing with China. However, even at 
this difficult time, the U.N. treaty bodies, thematic special rapporteurs and working groups, 
and specialized agencies have continued to maintain their standards and their rigor.”). 
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C. Strengthening the Role of Treaty Bodies Within the United 
Nations 
There are several ways to strengthen the role of treaty bodies 
within the United Nations.  Emphasizing the importance of the 
treaty bodies’ standard-setting abilities could increase available 
funding for treaty body initiatives.  Treaty bodies play a critical role 
in motivating countries to comply with human rights laws161 and, 
unlike the enforcement mechanisms of political bodies, they are 
unbiased and impervious to manipulation.  When U.N. political 
bodies are at a standstill, treaty bodies can fill the gap by issuing 
public condemnation, making them a vital part of the human rights 
enforcement machinery.  As such, their processes should be 
accorded more weight and should not be constrained by limited 
funding. 
With extra resources, treaty bodies can conduct their work more 
effectively, extending their reach to include a wider range of issues.  
A raise in funding would mean additional independent experts, 
ultimately leading to increased attentiveness to state monitoring, 
inquiries, reports, general comments, and reviews of individual 
complaints.  It would also enable treaty bodies to issue detailed 
special reports for egregious human rights violations, bringing 
attention to situations that are too grave to overlook.  In turn, serious 
human rights violations would be given additional exposure—even 
if they are not attended to in the United Nations’ political arenas—
which would reinforce the United Nations’ shaming powers.  
Special reports also legitimize individual states’ initiatives to 
address another state’s misconduct.  In cases where a human rights 
violators’ political authority commands a larger group of supporters 
than those condemning its human rights violations (e.g., China 
mobilizing a group of 37 countries to defend its human rights 
violations in Xinjiang), a special report would strengthen the impact 
of initiatives undertaken by states independently (e.g., the United 
States’ restrictions on Chinese officials and blacklist of Chinese 
companies). 
An inherent limitation of treaty bodies is that they rely heavily 
on state cooperation to carry out some of their more important 
functions,162 like state periodic reviews and reviews of individual 
 
 161 See Sceats & Breslin, supra note 1, at 18. 
 162 See KENT, supra note 14, at 14 (“[T]reaty and thematic bodies . . .  depend to a 
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complaints.  Minimizing this limitation would go a long way 
towards strengthening the role of treaty bodies within the United 
Nations.  To that end, treaty bodies should conduct periodic reviews 
and hear individual complaints independent of a state’s actions.  
Even when a state fails to produce a report for its periodic review, 
NGOs should still present information on its human rights 
conditions and the committee should assess its human rights 
compliance.  Reviews of individual complaints should be treated 
similarly.  Not only would this bolster the work that treaty bodies 
have already done, but it would give credence to future 
recommendations by reinforcing the idea that states cannot avoid 
compliance with human rights obligations.  Injustices do not stop 
existing just because a state evades its duties, and it is important for 
the United Nations to underscore that message.163 
D. Potential Counter Arguments 
One potential counter argument to this proposed solution is that 
treaty bodies cannot actually compel states to fulfill their 
international human rights obligations, making them potentially less 
effective in garnering state compliance than entities with stronger 
enforcement mechanisms like sanctions or embargos.  Although 
treaty bodies cannot levy strong enforcement mechanisms in the 
traditional sense, their standard-setting and shaming abilities are 
powerful compliance motivators.  Notwithstanding their non-
coercive nature, treaty bodies can apply intense pressure on states 
to conform with international human rights norms.164  In China’s 
case, 
[T]he most significant effect of the U.N. regime has not derived 
from its supervision of the implementation of China’s domestic 
human rights obligations, since U.N. monitoring on Chinese soil 
has required a Chinese consent that, with respect to the case 
studies, has been withheld. Rather, it has been located in the 
standard setting and promotional aspects of the U.N. regime at the 
international level.165 
In addition, China’s aversion to criticism likely means that it 
 
large extent on the continuing cooperation of the state involved.”). 
 163 See HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 7, at 92–94 (discussing a list of possible 
recommendations the United Nations could utilize). 
 164 KENT, supra note 14, at 10–11. 
 165 Id. at 247. 
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becomes more hostile to stronger displays of public condemnation, 
thereby making it less amenable to modifying its behavior.  China 
has yet to modify its behavior in Xinjiang in response to U.S.  
restrictions. 
One can also argue that a treaty body’s efficacy is limited by its 
reliance on state consent.  It is true that states can dampen the impact 
of the treaty body system by withholding their approval.166  
However, his paper argues that state non-compliance can be 
overcome, in certain cases, if treaty bodies are given the ability to 
perform more functions with or without a state’s cooperation.167  For 
instance, treaty bodies should be able to conduct periodic reviews 
even if a state decides not to participate in the process.  However, 
because it is not possible for treaty bodies to accomplish all of their 
responsibilities without state approval, this limitation cannot be 
dismissed entirely. 
IV. Conclusion 
The gravity of the Uighur crisis in Xinjiang necessitates U.N. 
intervention.  However, China’s position as a powerful player in the 
United Nations and the global arena generally makes international 
intervention a difficult feat.  This paper recommends a solution for 
the Chinese Uighur crisis that may also prove effective beyond this 
specific controversy.  China’s propensity to manipulate U.N. 
processes using its political power means that the United Nations 
must look outside of its political bodies for a resolution.  This paper 
argues that, by strengthening the role of treaty bodies, the United 
Nations may have a better chance of encouraging powerful states 





 166 See Sceats & Breslin, supra note 1, at 36 (“To date, China has refused to allow 
application to China of any of the treaty bodies’ stronger enforcement tools. Most 
importantly, it has not accepted any of the individual complaints or dispute resolution 
mechanisms provided for in the treaties.”); see also HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 7, at 54 
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 167 See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
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